CVE-2026-27013

Description

fabric.js applies `escapeXml()` to text content during SVG export (`src/shapes/Text/TextSVGExportMixin.ts:186`) but fails to apply it to other user-controlled string values that are interpolated into SVG attribute markup. When attacker-controlled JSON is loaded via `loadFromJSON()` and later exported via `toSVG()`, the unescaped values break out of XML attributes and inject arbitrary SVG elements including event handlers. ### Deserialization Path (no sanitization) `loadFromJSON()` (`src/canvas/StaticCanvas.ts:1229`) calls `enlivenObjects()` which calls `_fromObject()` (`src/shapes/Object/Object.ts:1902`). `_fromObject` passes all deserialized properties to the shape constructor via `new this(enlivedObjectOptions)`. The constructor ultimately calls `_setOptions()` (`src/CommonMethods.ts:9`) which iterates over every property and assigns it to the object via `this.set(prop, options[prop])`. There is no allowlist or sanitization - any property in the JSON, including `id`, is set verbatim on the fabric object. --- ### Finding 1: XSS via `id` Property Injection The `id` property from deserialized JSON is interpolated directly into SVG attribute strings without escaping. **Vulnerable code (`src/shapes/Object/FabricObjectSVGExportMixin.ts`, line 89, `getSvgCommons()`):** ```typescript getSvgCommons( this: FabricObjectSVGExportMixin & FabricObject & { id?: string }, ) { return [ this.id ? `id="${this.id}" ` : '', // <-- unescaped, user-controlled this.clipPath ? `clip-path="url(#${...})" ` : '', ].join(''); } ``` This method is called in `_createBaseSVGMarkup()` (same file, line 178) which wraps every object's SVG output in a `<g>` element. Every fabric object type (Rect, Circle, Path, Text, Image, Group, etc.) inherits this mixin, so the `id` injection vector applies to all object types. **Contrast with text content, which IS escaped:** ```typescript // src/shapes/Text/TextSVGExportMixin.ts:186 return `<tspan ...>${escapeXml(char)}</tspan>`; ``` The inconsistency shows that the intention was to prevent injection but was missed w attribute contexts. --- ### Finding 2: XSS via Image `src` / `xlink:href` Injection Image source URLs are interpolated raw into `xlink:href` in `_toSVG()`. **Vulnerable code (`src/shapes/Image.ts`, line 404, `_toSVG()`):** ```typescript imageMarkup.push( '\t<image ', 'COMMON_PARTS', `xlink:href="${this.getSvgSrc(true)}" x="${x - this.cropX}" y="${ y - this.cropY }" ...` // <-- unescaped ); ``` `getSvgSrc()` returns the image `src` property which is set from JSON during deserialization. An attacker can inject a `src` value that breaks out of the `xlink:href` attribute. --- ### Finding 3: XSS via Pattern `sourceToString()` **Vulnerable code (`src/Pattern/Pattern.ts`, line 181, `toSVG()`):** ```typescript `<image x="0" y="0" ... xlink:href="${this.sourceToString()}"></image>` // <-- unescaped, returns this.source.src for image sources ``` Additionally, Pattern's constructor (`line 92–94`) runs `this.id = uid()` *before* `Object.assign(this, options)`, meaning a user-supplied `id` in the pattern JSON overwrites the auto-generated uid. The pattern `id` is then interpolated unescaped on line 180: ```typescript `<pattern id="SVGID_${id}" x="${patternOffsetX}" ...>` ``` --- ### Finding 4: Gradient `id` Partial Injection (lower Severity) **Vulnerable code (`src/gradient/Gradient.ts`, line 212, `toSVG()`):** ```typescript `id="SVGID_${this.id}"` // <-- unescaped ``` Gradient's constructor (`line 125`) computes `id: id ? `${id}_${uid()}` : uid()`. If a user-supplied `id` is present in the gradient JSON, it is prepended to the auto-generated uid. The user-controlled portion is interpolated unescaped into the SVG. This is exploitable but the payload is constrained by the `_<uid>` suffix appended after it. --- ## Impact Any application that: 1. Accepts user-supplied JSON (via `loadFromJSON()`, collaborative sharing, import features, CMS plugins), AND 2. Renders the `toSVG()` output in a browser context (SVG preview, export download rendered in-page, email template, embed) ...is vulnerable to stored XSS. An attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the victim's browser session. Real-world attack scenarios: - Collaborative design tools (Canva-like apps) where users share canvas state as JSON - CMS or e-commerce platforms with fabric.js-based editors that store/render designs - Any export-to-SVG workflow where the SVG is later displayed in a browser --- ## Remediation Update to [fabric.js 7.2.0](https://github.com/fabricjs/fabric.js/releases/tag/v720) or newer version. --- ## Confirmed Affected Files | File | Issue | Method | Exploitable | |---|---|---|---| | `src/shapes/Object/FabricObjectSVGExportMixin.ts` | Unescaped `this.id` in attribute | `getSvgCommons()` | Yes - primary vector, all object types | | `src/shapes/Image.ts` | Unescaped `getSvgSrc()` in `xlink:href` | `_toSVG()` | Yes | | `src/Pattern/Pattern.ts` | Unescaped `sourceToString()` in `xlink:href`; unescaped `id` in attribute | `toSVG()` | Yes | | `src/gradient/Gradient.ts` | User-supplied `id` prefix interpolated unescaped | `toSVG()` | Yes (partial - uid suffix appended) |