CVE-2026-47726

Description

`internal/api/audit.go:12` — `handleGetAuditLog` does no admin check. The route is bearer-auth gated only; any operator API key returns the full audit log via `store.ListAuditEntries` (up to limit=1000). This includes cross-tenant actor names, host/CA/operator IDs, action timestamps, and masked-IP entries from rate-limit refusals — enough surface for a tenant to enumerate the server's activity, infer staffing patterns, or identify high-value targets. ## Affected All released versions up to v0.3.1. ## Reproducer ``` curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <any-operator-key>" \ https://server/api/v1/audit-log?limit=1000 ``` ## Suggested fix Two options, either acceptable: 1. `if !actorIsAdmin(ctx) { 403 }` — strictest; matches the "operator management is admin-only" stance. 2. Scope to actor: filter `store.ListAuditEntries` by `actor.Username` plus a subquery of CA IDs the actor owns. Operators see their own audit entries plus entries against their CA's resources. Recommend option 1 unless the UI needs per-operator audit views. ## Suggested patch Verified locally: `go vet`, `go test -race -count=1 ./...`, `golangci-lint v2.12` all clean. ```diff diff --git a/internal/api/audit.go b/internal/api/audit.go index 3236631..57b57ce 100644 --- a/internal/api/audit.go +++ b/internal/api/audit.go @@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ import ( const defaultAuditLimit = 100 func (s *Server) handleGetAuditLog(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + if !actorIsAdmin(r.Context()) { + writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "audit log access requires the admin role") + return + } filter := store.AuditFilter{ Action: r.URL.Query().Get("action"), Limit: defaultAuditLimit, diff --git a/internal/api/audit_admin_test.go b/internal/api/audit_admin_test.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..47e1ca4 --- /dev/null +++ b/internal/api/audit_admin_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +package api + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/sha256" + "encoding/hex" + "net/http" + "net/http/httptest" + "testing" + + "github.com/google/uuid" + "github.com/juev/nebula-mesh/internal/models" +) + +// TestHandleGetAuditLog_NonAdminForbidden confirms a non-admin operator +// API key cannot read the audit log. The legacy config-key path stays +// admin and is covered by the happy-path test elsewhere. +func TestHandleGetAuditLog_NonAdminForbidden(t *testing.T) { + srv, _ := newTestServer(t) + + nonAdminKey := uuid.New().String() + keyHash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(nonAdminKey)) + if err := srv.store.CreateOperator(context.Background(), &models.Operator{ + ID: uuid.New().String(), Username: "non-admin", PasswordHash: "x", + Role: "user", Status: models.OperatorStatusActive, + }); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + op, err := srv.store.GetOperatorByUsername(context.Background(), "non-admin") + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + if err := srv.store.CreateOperatorAPIKey(context.Background(), &models.OperatorAPIKey{ + ID: uuid.New().String(), OperatorID: op.ID, KeyHash: hex.EncodeToString(keyHash[:]), + }); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/v1/audit-log", nil) + req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+nonAdminKey) + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + srv.ServeHTTP(rec, req) + + if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden { + t.Errorf("non-admin audit-log status = %d, want 403", rec.Code) + } +} + +// TestHandleGetAuditLog_LegacyKeyAllowed confirms the legacy config-key +// path still reaches the handler (preserves backward compatibility). +func TestHandleGetAuditLog_LegacyKeyAllowed(t *testing.T) { + srv, _ := newTestServer(t) + + req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/v1/audit-log", nil) + req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+testAPIKey) + rec := httptest.NewRecorder() + srv.ServeHTTP(rec, req) + + if rec.Code == http.StatusForbidden { + t.Errorf("legacy key rejected with 403; want pass-through") + } +} ```